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ELIZABETH (WENDY) HAZARD
THE MAINE REMEMBERED:
RESPONSES TO  THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR IN THE
PINE TREE STATE
The Spanish-American war marked the 
emergence of the United States from a country 
concerned primarily with its own internal devel­
opment to one that exercised its power and 
influence on the world stage. Maine citizens 
and the state’s political leaders understood that 
they were witnessing an historic turn in the 
nation 5 history. They were not passive observ­
ers, however. Many participated eagerly in the 
war effort. Others vehemently protested an 
expansionist foreign policy and the ambitions of 
the war's promoters. This article tracks the 
war's progress through the experiences of Maine 
people who lived through it and assesses the 
contributions they made to the important debate 
that accompanied the conflict. Elizabeth (Wendy) 
Hazard received her Ph.D. in History from  
Boston University in 1994. She lives in Belgrade 
and is the editor o/THE DISSIDENT, a Maine 
journal of politics and culture.
The centennial anniversary of the Spanish-American War 
provides a com pelling opportunity to look again at the legacy of 
that war, and the ways in which Americans responded to it in 
Maine and in the nation. “The Splendid Little W ar,” as Secretary 
of State Jo h n  Hay called the nation’s first international conflict,
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On February 15, 1898, at 9:40 P.M., the battleship Mamr was destroyed by an explosion 
that killed 260 officers and men. The disaster touched off a nationwide debate that led 
to war with Spain that spring. Most of Maine's powerful congressional delegation, and 
many others throughout the state, opposed this bitter prelude to overseas empire. THE 
MAINE: AN ACCOUNT OF HER DESTRUCTION IN HAVANA HARBOR (1899).
ended in a quick and decisive victory over Spain and netted the 
United States an overseas em pire o f its own. That same war, and 
the one that resulted from it to quash insurrection in the 
Philippines, provoked a prolonged national debate that pitted 
Americans who supported the exercise o f United States’ global 
power against those who feared the exercise would threaten the 
interests o f ordinary Americans and underm ine the nation’s 
com m itm ent to dem ocratic principles at home. In Maine that 
debate was vigorous. Despite its size, the state played an
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im portant role in the war effort. Its contributions o f m en and 
arms were significant, and the positions that Maine people 
adopted had im portant implications for those responsible for 
conducting U.S. foreign policy during this critical turning point 
in Am erican history. The war, in turn, had an impact on the 
people and the economy of the state that continues to this day.
In the spring o f 1898, war fever swept Maine. Along with 
thousands across the nation, Mainers took up the national call to 
“Rem em ber the M aine,” their state’s iron-hulled namesake that 
had exploded on  February 15 in Havana’s harbor carrying 276 
U.S. sailors to their death. Eager to avenge what a sensationalist 
press characterized as a blatant act o f war against the U nited 
States, and what ardent militarists like Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy T heodore Roosevelt had called a “dirty act of Spanish 
treachery,” M ainers were ready to jo in  what many believed 
would be a great and glorious national crusade. Before Congress 
declared war against Spain and President McKinley issued the 
first call for civilian volunteers to augm ent the critically under­
staffed regular Army, state A djutant General John  Richards, 
G overnor Llewellan Powers, and the Maine congressional del­
egation in W ashington were deluged with letters from  m en 
eager to take up  the fight. The Lewiston Evening Journal reported, 
“Men who couldn’t be hired to come hom e to vote are coming 
hom e of their own free will and accord to go to war.”1
For m onths, M aine’s newspapers, like the national press, 
had  teem ed with news of war in Cuba and of the struggle of 
Cuban nationalists for independence from  Spanish rule. Since 
1895, when Cuban revolutionaries had announced a provisional, 
independent governm ent, journalists and propagandists sympa­
thetic to their cause, and those Americans who believed that the 
country’s interests and their own could profit from  war with 
Spain, had worked tirelessly to rally public support for “Cuba 
Libre.” P roponents for a war with Spain, ardent expansionists 
like Captain Alfred Mahan, T heodore Roosevelt, and Massachu­
setts Senator H enry Cabot Lodge, were convinced that the 
U nited States’ prosperity required the nation to com pete with 
E urope’s im perial powers in a grab for markets around the
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world. Intervention in Cuba in 1898 appeared to provide a 
timely and critical opportunity to go to war, deliver Spain a 
crippling blow, and seize the last vestiges of its overseas empire.
P resident McKinley had not wanted war. But he did want the results that only war could bring, including the protection of American investments threatened 
by the fighting in Cuba and the extension of U.S. influence in the 
Caribbean and Pacific oceans. As the war in Cuba intensified, he 
dispatched the Maine to the Havana harbor on an ostensibly 
friendly mission to protect American lives and the $50 million 
worth of American properties on the island. W hen the Maine 
exploded, he wanted no rush to judgm ent and ordered  an 
official naval inquiry to determ ine the cause of the blast. Mem­
bers of his adm inistration, and many in Congress, doubted that 
Spain wanted to provoke war with the U nited States and believed 
it unlikely that the Spanish com m and in Cuba would have 
authorized an attack on a U.S. warship. The results o f the inquiry 
proved inconclusive, but, by early April, the public pressure for 
war had becom e so intense that the President could delay it no 
longer.2 In his war message on April 25, McKinley carefully 
cloaked any expansionist goals in the garb of hum anitarian 
assistance that was sure to win favor with the American people. 
Speaking before a jo in t session of Congress, he said, "the United 
States will fight in the cause of humanity, to rescue the people of 
Cuba from  bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries.”3
T hroughout the country, Americans responded ecstati­
cally. In Maine, hom etown companies rallied. G overnor Powers 
reported  that the Maine National Guard had two volunteer 
infantry regim ents ready for enlistment, an am bulance corps, a 
signal corps, and three battalions with seventy-two officers and 
“the largest num ber o f m en per company allowed by law.”4
W hen the new recruits gathered in their respective towns 
and readied to board the troop trains that would carry them  to 
the state training camp in Augusta, a fierce sense of local pride 
and local identification with the war’s goals accom panied them. 
The Maine Farmer, the weekly paper o f the Maine State Grange, 
reported, “villages vied with towns in tendering receptions to the
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boys in blue.... Loyalty reigned suprem e.”5 In W estbrook, the 
tow n’s mayor told the recruits,
When Old Glory floats proudly over the Isle of Cuba, the 
people of Westbrook will all rejoice when you come proudly 
marching home. I have every confidence that the Almighty 
ruler of the universe through the instrumentality of the most 
intelligent people on the face of the globe, the American 
people, will pass safely through this crisis as we have in 
centuries before.
The mayor of Lewiston told the volunteers from  that city, 
“Go forth, and  as you take leave, the loyal sons and daughters of 
the city cheer you on .”6 In Portland, the send-off was thunder­
ous. City Hall and the Armory were draped in banners and 
illum inated with signs reading “Rem em ber the M aine” As the 
m en m arched up  Middle Street to M onum ent Square and down 
Congress Street, crowds lined their route, waving flags, cheering 
and firing off small canons. National colors and military trap­
pings were reportedly the fashion rage for women: “Red white 
and blue is assuredly somewhere about her and she is begging 
insignia and ribbons, buttons or buckles from  every man she 
can.”7
M aine’s Civil W ar veterans led the chorus of supporters, 
thrilling to the idea that Americans who only thirty-five years 
earlier had been  wrenched apart in violent sectional struggle 
were ready at last to m arch together in a national crusade.8 
C om m ander Southard of the GAR addressed the Lewiston 
volunteers: “Let your battle cry be Freedom  — American Free­
dom! ... We of the G rand Army wish it were possible that we 
could go with you and once m ore rally under Old Glory for 
freedom  and right.”9
A pro-war editorial in the Lewiston Evening Journal entitled 
“The Value o f the W ar Fever " expressed a widely held belief that 
war with Spain would finally unite the nation as it had not been 
united since the Civil War. It included the story o f an A uburn 
m an just re tu rned  from  a m on th ’s tour of the South who had 
found national sentim ent there soaring: “In the first half o f his
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In micl-June a force of 17,000 regulars and volunteers arrived at Tampa, Florida, to await 
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Roosevelt, who later made their famous assault on San Juan Hill. As assistant secretary 
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trip, his ears were filled with local prejudice, narrow politics and 
crude social views. Then came the incident o f the Maine;...the 
result is the South is federalized....There have been men who 
were feeble until they had the typhoid; so there are nations that 
have been regarded as deficient in patriotism until they have had 
a fever of war.”10
T he great outpouring of national sentim ent seemed to put to rest concern am ong veteran’s groups and patriotic organizations that patriotism had waned in 
the years following the Civil War. I.ong years o f peace, they 
feared, had underm ined military preparedness and had discour­
aged a spirit o f national unity even as unrestricted immigration 
and labor unrest in industrial centers had divided the country 
along class and ethnic lines.11 At the same time that expansion-
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ists like Roosevelt and M ahan were blasting the country’s mili­
tary unpreparedness and prom oting an internationalist foreign 
policy, these patriotic societies launched campaigns to foster 
patriotism  and introduce nationalist rituals and military training 
in the nation’s schools. In 1888, a widely circulated magazine, 
Youth's Companion, led a drive for a “flag in every school,” and in 
1892, the m agazine’s editor, Jam es Bailey Upton, wrote and 
published th  e Pledge of Allegiance in hopes that school children all 
over America would recite it as part of a daily ritual expression.12 
In Maine, the DAR adopted the project and began furnishing 
flags for schools around the state.13 W hen war was declared in 
April 1898, the Superintendent o f Schools in Belfast, following 
the example of others throughout the country, ordered  his 
schools, for the first time, to raise the flag daily and to begin each 
day with the national anthem  and the pledge of allegiance.14 
Clearly the jingoism  that accom panied the onset of the Spanish- 
American war had given patriotic initiatives an aura of urgency.
W hen war was first declared, a brief flurry o f panic ensued 
throughout M aine’s coastal communities; exaggerated notions 
of Spain’s m aritim e power convinced residents that their towns 
would becom e targets of a naval assault. As one paper editori­
alized: “The Spaniards are a crafty race and...the thirst for 
vengeance is so deeply im planted in the Spanish nature that he 
is capable of anything to get even.”15 Fears soon subsided, 
however, when the W ar D epartm ent began to fortify the Maine 
coastline. By April 26, two hundred  soldiers had arrived to take 
up positions at Fort Preble and Portland H ead in Casco Bay. 
Mine fields were placed at the entrance to Portland H arbor and 
ten-inch guns were installed at Portland H ead.16 An eight-inch 
rifled cannon, and one hundred  mines and torpedoes guarded 
the m outh o f the Kennebec, and a "mosquito fleet” o f small 
vessels was dispatched upriver to defend Bath. Twenty-one 
mines were placed in the Penobscot River in the Bucksport 
Narrows to pro tect Fort Knox.17 Over one hundred  volunteers 
from  the First Maine Heavy Artillery were garrisoned at Fort 
Popham  and three and six-inch gun installations were erected at 
Fort Lyon on Cow Island and Fort Levett on Cushing Island.18
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While the Maine volunteers who responded to the president’s 
call in 1898 were infused with patriotic enthusiasm, their motives 
for enlistm ent varied. Most, undoubtedly, sought after great 
adventure. They hoped also that the whole o f their hom etown 
companies would be incorporated into M aine’s two regionally 
based National G uard regiments, and that they would be allowed 
to serve alongside neighbors and friends, as a visible expression 
of their own com m unities’ contribution to the national cause. 
Their insistence created difficulties for Powers, whose orders 
from the Secretary of W ar expressly indicated that M aine’s quota 
be filled by the National Guard regiments. W hen he learned that 
a third of the volunteers did not pass the medical examination 
required by the U.S. Army, the governor requested that those 
who had not been  rejected combine to form  the First Infantry 
Regiment. Most of the men of the Second Regiment decided to 
refuse im m ediate enlistment, preferring instead to retu rn  hom e 
and await a future call when they might rally sufficient num bers 
to serve together as a complete regiment. Fortunately for 
Powers, who needed to fill M aine’s quota in a timely fashion, 
forty students from  the University of Maine, all of whom had 
received drill and tactical instruction at school, came forward to 
enlist with the First Maine Infantry.19
The majority of volunteers were farmers, industrial work­
ers, office clerks, and day laborers. Many may have welcomed 
escape from  the m onotony of their jobs, but others, no doubt, 
were also attracted by the monthly stipend that was offered for 
enlistm ent and service: $22 for privates, $26 for corporals, and 
$34 for sergeants.20 M aine’s economy had staggered through a 
twenty-five year national depression that had grown particularly 
acute in the 1890s. Chronic unem ploym ent stalked com m uni­
ties throughout the state. Maine farmers, sufferingfrom  western 
com petition, reduced their acreage and abandoned their farms 
to look for a better living in the industrial sector.21 For those who 
did no t have employable skills or who could not find steady work, 
day labor was often the only alternative. The hard  work of 
digging ditches and grading roads was seasonal, usually poorly 
paid, and offered little security. As labor historian Charles
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Scontras has written, the line between day labor and destitution 
was thin.22 Day laborers and farm ers made up the largest 
categories o f volunteers in 1898.23
After day laborers and farmers, the largest num bers of 
enlistees derived from  weavers, spinners, paper makers, machin­
ists, and clerks, all o f whom had also suffered from  the long 
depression. Increasing regional com petition from  southern 
m anufacturers had led the m anagem ents o f textile, paper and 
shoe and o ther Maine industries to adopt cost-cutting strategies 
in the 1890s. These included frequent lay-offs, wage cuts, and 
shorter hours. Scontras, using data collected for the annual state 
labor reports, calculated that up to 42 percent o f the state’s 
shoemakers, 38 percent o f the textile operatives, 35 percent of 
the quarry workers, and 64 percent o f the lime workers were 
unem ployed during the period. The pay checks of those who still 
retained their jobs reflected the frequent cuts in hours and 
wages.24
To encourage early enlistment, Governor Powers assured 
workers that the state would make up any difference between 
their army pay and what they had earned before their enlistment, 
even if it m eant that he had to raise the funds on his own. As he 
told the legislature when it m et in January 1899, “many of the 
m en were in pressing need...and others m ust have som ething to 
send to their very destitute families or leave them  in want. ”25 The 
owners of the Pepperill textile mills, not to be outdone by the 
governor’s expression of patriotism , prom ised that any worker 
who responded  to the nation ’s call to arms would be assured of 
his jo b  upon  re tu rn  from  duty.26
No Maine com m unity benefited m ore from  the war with 
Spain than Bath, where congressional war appropriations brought 
a sudden and welcome surge in prosperity. The Bath Iron 
Works, the naval shipyard established in 1884, won valuable 
contracts from  the U.S. governm ent in 1897 and 1898 to repair 
two American warships and build five torpedo boats, two gun­
boats, a cargo steamer, and a training vessel for the Naval 
Academy at Annapolis. By the end of 1898, a much expanded 
shipyard had contracts w orth m ore than $2 million and enough
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work to carry it profitably into the twentieth century. It em­
ployed 1,000 men, had a payroll of over $360,000, and made 
substantial investments in its m anufacturing potential. The 
expansion had a critical im pact on the entire midcoast. As a 1898 
state report noted, “Maine and the city o f Bath cannot too highly 
appreciate the value of the Bath Iron Works. Besides the vast 
sums of m oney it distributes for labor..., it enables the Pine Tree 
State to say in shipbuilding as in statesmanship, “Dirigo, I lead.”27
D espite the excited frenzy of the early days of recruit­m ent and the enthusiasm of local officials and business leaders, the war against Spain did not go 
unopposed in Maine. For a small but vocal group o f leading 
politicians, writers, and reform  activists, the war, and the asser­
tion of American power overseas, had dangerous implications. 
A cohesive anti-imperialist movement failed to em erge in Maine 
as it did in Massachusetts, New York, and Illinois, bu t the Spanish 
American W ar did trigger protest and debate am ong those who 
feared that the acquisition of foreign territories would violate 
fundam ental principles of American democracy. Four members 
o f M aine’s powerful congressional delegation — Speaker o f the 
House Thom as Brackett Reed, House Ways and Means Com mit­
tee Chair Nelson Dingley, House Naval Affairs Com m ittee Chair 
Charles Boutelle, and Senate Naval A ppropriations Com m ittee 
Chair Eugene Hale — opposed the drift to war and used their 
personal and political influence to avert it. The fact that all were 
Republicans, and  m embers o f the president’s party, gave them  
extra prom inence, and their powerful positions in the Congress 
provided them  ample forum  to advocate their cause. In addi­
tion, they enjoyed the support of some of M aine’s leading 
newspapers. Boutelle owned a controlling interest in the Bangor 
Whig and Courier, and the Eastern Argus, although a Democratic 
paper, consistently gave Portland’s Thomas Brackett Reed its 
editorial backing.
Early on, Reed had broken with other Republican party 
stalwarts, determ ined to use his formidable power to block U.S. 
expansion overseas. An imposing figure who stood over six feet 
three inches tall and weighed between 250 and 275 pounds,
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Along with three other members of Maine’s congressional delegation. Senator Eugene 
Hale, chair of the Senate Naval Appropriations Committee, opposed the drift to war. As 
members of the part) in office, holding ke\ committee positions, Maine delegates 
wielded enormous power in Congress. Maine Historical Society photo.
Reed towered over his colleagues. He had dom inated the House 
since he was elected speaker in 18<S9. He made a lasting mark on 
the institution when he introduced “Reed’s Rules,” a key parlia­
m entary reform  that had finally ended the ability of an obstruc­
tionist minority to block legislation. The tactics he used to bring 
recalcitrant Democrats to heel earned him the nickname “Czar 
Reed.”-S W ielding his power brilliantly, he derailed army appro­
priations bills, repeatedly blocked legislation for the annexation 
of Hawaii, and fought to deny any diplomatic o r military assis­
tance to Cuba that would precipitate war with Spain. In a series
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of articles for the North American Review and The Illustrated 
American, Reed used the persuasive powers of his prodigious 
intellect to dam pen public enthusiasm for territorial expansion. 
He tracked the rise and fall of em pires over the course o f history 
and concluded that the rapid extension of power over too wide 
a territory led invariably to discord and decline. Americans, he 
cautioned, should instead heed the adm onition of George 
W ashington, in his Farewell Address, to stay clear of in terna­
tional entanglem ents. So doing, Reed argued, “we shall grow, 
unattached and peaceful up to the gigantic possibilities o f the 
territory we have already acquired.”29
For over a decade, Reed had supported expenditures to 
m odernize the Navy, bu t in 1897, as pressure for war m ounted, 
he began to resist further appropriations. Responding to the 
contention m ade by Henry Cabot Lodge that the naval build-up 
was a critical form  of “national insurance,” Reed wrote that if this 
was the case, its buildup should not engage the U.S. in a 
expensive arms race with other countries. “We must be careful 
about over insurance,” he wrote.30 After the explosion of the 
Maine, Reed denounced the jingo hysteria and announced that 
he would no longer support appropriations for battleships, an 
extraordinary position for a representative from  a state that 
stood to benefit handsomely from  military contracts for its 
nascent ship-building industry.
Eugene Hale shared R eed’s antipathy for war and his 
concern about the dangers o f overseas expansion. As chair of the 
Senate Naval Affairs committee, he too advocated military 
preparedness and had worked to m odernize the Navy.31 As the 
pressure for war grew, Hale cautioned restraint and becam e an 
advocate for peace: “I for one have been disturbed and m ade 
anxious by the growth of what I may call the aggressive spirit as 
shown particularly within the lastyear;...the desire to aggress, the 
desire to incite trouble, the desire to make difficulties with 
foreign powers,...the turning aside the plowshare and pruning 
hook and giving m en’s attention to the sword and rifle.”32 In 
1896 and 1897, Hale argued against recognizing Cuban sover­
eignty, certain that this would lead to war with Spain. Instead, he
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com pared the Cuban insurrection to the Confederacy’s rebel­
lion and rem inded his colleagues that Spain had rem ained the 
U nion’s loyal ally during the Civil War.
Congressm en Nelson Dingley and Charles Boutelle re­
sisted efforts to recognize Cuban independence and opposed 
the annexation of Spanish territories. Dingley did not want to 
break openly with the adm inistration, however, and when war 
was declared, it was "with a heavy heart bu t with a patriotic sense 
o f duty,” that he began preparing a $500 million war revenue 
bill.33 Boutelle joined fellow Republicans Reed and Hale, and 
several Democrats, in a anti-imperialist coalition that began to 
focus its attention on the probable results o f the war.
O nly one m em ber of the Maine delegation, Repub­lican Senator William Frye, supported the war. Frye had been elected to the Senate to fill Jam es G. 
Blaine’s seat when the latter was appointed Secretary of State in 
1881. He em braced his predecessor's enthusiasm for American 
expansion and, like Blaine, lobbied hard  for a strong navy.34 As 
chair o f the Senate Com m erce Committee, Frye m aintained 
steady pressure for the annexation of Hawaii and the acquisition 
o f an isthmian canal to expedite trade with the Far East. W hen 
war with Spain grew imm inent, he threw his full support behind 
it, allying him self with V erm ont Senator Redfield Proctor, an 
ardent expansionist who had ju st retu rned  from  an official visit 
to Cuba. Proctor had prepared  an inflammatory speech detail­
ing the brutalities of Spanish rule, and Frye used his considerable 
influence to in terrup t Senate proceedings to allow Proctor to 
take the floor. The speech, which told in chilling detail about the 
suffering, im prisonm ent, and starvation of Cuban civilians, had 
its desired effect, and was credited with galvanizing popular and 
congressional support for the war.35 Reed rem ained unmoved, 
caustically rem arking that the speech was ju s t what might have 
been expected from  Proctor, who happened to own controlling 
interest in the lucrative V erm ont Marble Company: “The war will 
make a large m arket for gravestones,” Reed said.36 Frye’s 
orchestration o f Proctor's speech proved critical, and his ardent 
support for the war won him  the lasting gratitude of Theodore
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Roosevelt and other leading expansionists, who honored  him 
with a lavish reception in New York City the following year.
P rom inent m em bers o f M aine’s literary com munity also 
opposed the war. Poet E.A. Robinson becam e an outspoken 
critic, and jo ined  the New England Anti-Imperialist League 
when it was founded in January 1899. In a letter to a friend in 
April 1898, he wrote: “My Americanism is not at all ram pant — 
in fact the crudeness and the general cussedness of things 
American makes me sick.”37 Novelist William Dean Howells, 
who observed the war fever from  his sum m er hom e in Kittery, 
characterized the Spanish-American war as “the height o f greed 
and folly.” In a letter to his sister in May 1898 he wrote, “We are 
deafened by war talk here. I hope that you will not be surprised 
to hear that I think we are wickedly wrong.”38 In 1898 Howells 
wrote his close friend and colleague Mark Twain that he had 
sailed his little boat from  Kittery up the Piscataqua River to 
Seavey’s Island, where 1,700 Spanish sailors captured in the 
Cuban cam paign had been im prisoned. Seeing them  cowed and 
despondent in a prison so near his idyllic Maine sum m er hom e 
deepened Howell’s disgust for the war and those responsible for 
it:
We saw them lying on the grass, or crowding the doors of 
their long barracks....Gatling guns overlooked them from 
three heights above....What must such captivity be to those 
poor boys!...It seemed impossible that we should have en­
tered upon this abominable business. If we were still in the 
habit of fearing God, we might well tremble when we 
remembered that he is just, just as Jefferson did when he 
thought of slavery.39
O ne of the m ost eloquent o f M aine’s anti-imperialists was 
the prom inent feminist and progressive activist H annah Bailey. 
A resident o f W inthrop and the widow of a wealthy Maine textile 
m anufacturer, Bailey becam e a leading activist in the causes of 
tem perance, w om en’s rights, and peace. She was also a prolific 
writer on suffrage and peace issues, tem perance, capital punish­
m ent, and prison reform . Believing that women needed to take 
a m ore active role in public life, Bailey served as treasurer of the
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National Council o f W omen, president o f the National Ameri­
can W om en’s Suffrage Association, and superintendent o f the 
W om en’s Christian Tem perance U nion’s (WCTU) D epartm ent 
of Peace and Arbitration.
For Bailey, the causes of tem perance and peace were closely 
related. “N othing leads toward war like intem perance,” she 
wrote, because “rebellious liquor in the blood poisons its peace.” 
The war with Spain, she believed, was a crude, intem perate 
response to an international conflict that could have been 
averted by diplomacy. Q uoting from Reed, who had becom e an 
im portant ally in a num ber of causes, Bailey wrote that “the time 
is no t far distant when the idea of going to war to settle 
international difficulties will be thought as strange and out of 
date as we now consider many o ther beliefs and practises [sic].” 
In contrast to the DAR and o ther patriotic and militaristic 
societies, the WCTU lobbied for peace education and the 
elimination o f war toys. Bailey wrote, “the young person 
possessing fighting instincts should be directed to use them  not 
against hum an foes, but against his own baser self.” Responding 
to T heodore Roosevelt’s noisy blandishm ents that nothing fos­
tered manliness and courage better than warfare, she countered: 
“Man, by engaging in warfare, defies nature whose plan is that no 
species shall becom e self-destructive.”40 T hroughout the Span- 
ish-American war and during the subsequent conflict in the 
Philippines, H annah Bailey consistently argued in behalf of 
international arbitration and an end to U.S. military occupation 
o f the Philippine Archipelago.
Bailey and the WCTU found an ally in their opposition to 
the war with Spain in the Grange (The Patrons of Husbandry), 
a farm ers’ organization which decried the wastefulness of war 
and the dangerous militancy it engendered. In April 1898, when 
war was first declared, the G range’s weekly paper, Maine Farmer, 
editorialized against the “false patriotism ” that had been “in­
flamed by an unprincipled press and the fires of greed and gain.” 
O n May 5, as Maine volunteers gathered for training at Fort 
Richards in Augusta, an editorial cautioned, “an ounce o f sober 
judgm ent would save millions o f lives and hasten operations
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looking to action which would ensure speedy peace.” Clearly, 
Maine farmers, who had seen their farms and fortunes dwindle 
in the years since the Civil W ar and who hoped for governm ent 
program s to alleviate their debt and provide affordable transpor­
tation, saw little to be gained from  costly military campaigns 
overseas.
O n May 4, 1898, when the news broke that Admiral Dewey 
had achieved the first great naval victory of the war by destroying 
the Spanish fleet in the Philippines, the Maine Farmer did not 
indulge in the general euphoria. The Maine Farmer saw Dewey’s 
easy trium ph as a harbinger o f danger and was quick to reiterate 
its critique of the war.
This war was declared to be for humanity, to relieve 
the starving in Cuba, and free [sic] from the bonds of 
oppressor, but the first guns of victory have wrought a 
change, and already argument on argument is presented to 
show the necessity for the United States taking its place with 
other nations, holding territory outside its present domain.... It 
is a serious question whether it is possible to pursue any 
longer the policy which the United States has pursued for so 
many years. A largely increased Army and Navy and the 
extension of jurisdiction are all involved and the danger is 
that politics will force a radical change from the avowed 
purpose in opening the hostilities.41
Dewey’s victory in the Philippines was followed by another 
smashing naval success outside Santiago H arbor on Cuba’s 
no rthern  coast and land campaigns in Cuba and Puerto Rico. It 
was all over in ju st four months.
O nly seventeen o f M aine’s 1,717 civilian volunteers who had enlisted so eagerly in April ever saw military action. The rest did not retu rn  hom e 
unscarred, however. O ne hundred  and fifty-one Maine soldiers 
died during the war, many of them  victims of typhoid fever in the 
Army training camp in Chickamauga, Tennessee.42 In late May, 
M aine’s First Infantry volunteers had been ordered  to Camp 
Thomas in Chickamauga, a poorly constructed base surrounded 
by fetid swamp land. Crowded barracks and poor sanitation 
com bined to make the camp a cesspool of contagion, and m en
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soon began to sicken and die. Major W.H. Daly, the Surgeon in 
Chief of Volunteers who was sent in to inspect conditions, 
reported  the camps were “polluted and filthy and the sanitary 
conditions deplorable.”43 The orders for Maine’s First Infantry 
were rescinded in August because so many had fallen ill.44
Despite urgent efforts to save their lives, many o f M aine’s 
young volunteers succumbed to the ravages of tropical fever. 
Townspeople and local officials, who only a few m onths earlier 
had so proudly sent them  off to war, worried that the soldiers’ 
contagion could spread in their communities. They insisted that 
the National G uard enforce strict sanitary precautions by isolat­
ing the soldiers, carefully burying their excretum outside city
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limits, sterilizing their blankets and sheets, and burning their 
mattresses. Those who survived were prom ised pensions, bu t 
the war had clearly not provided them  with the opportunity  for 
heroic adventure that they had so eagerly anticipated.45 In all, the 
U nited States suffered only 347 battle deaths, while 5,462 died 
from  illness.46
Only m em bers o f M aine’s Signal Corps, seventeen civilian 
volunteer telegraph operators, linemen, and electricians who 
were assigned as the 8th U.S. V olunteer Signal Corps, saw 
military action during the war. In the campaign to seize Santiago, 
they provided key com m unications support to the Army regulars 
in the midst o f heavy fighting. Three of the m en later succumbed 
to diseases contracted in Cuba. But their courage in battle had 
been noted, and the Corps was singled out for citation by 
General Greeley, the chief signal officer in the Army: M aine’s 
were the “first to report for duty in W ashington, [and]...the best 
equipped of any detachm ent...during the war.47 After the war, 
the First Maine Heavy Artillery served briefly in Cuba from 
January to M arch 1899, as part o f the occupying force stationed 
in Havana prio r to the establishment of a Cuban governm ent 
there. But they too retu rned  hom e unheralded and received 
none o f the attention that had accom panied their departure 
eleven m onths earlier. The focus of the country had shifted.
A defeated Spain sued for peace, and on August 13, 1898, agreed to the terms proposed by the McKinley adm inistration: independence for Cuba, U.S. an­
nexation of Puerto Rico, and U.S. military occupation of Manila. 
The Philippine archipelago, with its strategic location and valu­
able harbors, becam e the chief prize o f the Spanish war, but its 
final disposition rem ained an open question at the war’s end. 
Most Americans agreed that under no circumstances should the 
Philippines be retu rned  to Spain. There was no consensus, 
however, about who would govern the form er colony. U nder the 
leadership o f Emilio Aguinaldo, Philippine nationalists, who had 
long hoped  for independence, were adam ant that the Philip­
pines be granted their autonomy. They had not fought the 
Spanish only to have independence snatched from  them  by
180
M AINE  REMEMBERED
another imperial power, Aguinaldo said, and his forces pledged 
to resist any effort to recolonize their nation.48
Americans who opposed overseas expansion supported the 
Filipino nationalists’ claim, arguing the U.S. had no legal or 
m oral right to deny Filipinos their independence. The expan­
sionists, on the o ther hand, argued for the im m ediate annex­
ation of the entire archipelago. They dismissed the claims o f the 
Filipino people, arguing that were not ready for self rule. As one 
leading imperialist pu t it, “there are no t a hundred  m en am ong 
them  who com prehend what Anglo-Saxon self-government even 
m eans.”49 They also m aintained that the Philippines, w ithout 
U.S. protection, would fall prey to European imperial powers. A 
final decision awaited formal peace treaty negotiations sched­
uled for the fall in Paris.
To conduct these negotiations, McKinley selected a five 
person com mittee, three of whose members, namely Frye, New 
York Tribune editor Whitelaw Reid, and Chair of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Com mittee Cushm an Davis, were well-known 
ardent expansionists. Only one, Senator George Gray of Dela­
ware, opposed annexation.50 The commissioners heard testi­
mony from  the W ar D epartm ent assessing threats from  Euro­
pean rival powers and the defensibility of the islands in the event 
o f attack. They also heard  assurances from  U.S. com m anders 
that the Filipino nationalists were badly divided, poorly equipped, 
and could be easily subdued with 30,000 American soldiers.51 
O n O ctober 25, 1898, President McKinley instructed the Com­
mission to dem and full possession o f all the islands. In return, 
the United States offered Spain $20 million.
The final treaty agreed to by Spain in Paris had to be 
formally ratified by the Senate; again, there were sharp differ­
ences over the Philippines. The debate in Maine was passionate. 
Frye cham pioned the treaty and insisted that the U nited States 
would annex the Philippines with the very best of intentions. 
“They have been  acquired honestly,” he said: “We will hold them  
as our own, for the good of the peoples who inhabit them  and for 
the imm ense advantage, commercially, they prom ise us....We 
will build highways, construct railroads, erect school houses and
181
M AINE  REMEMBERED
churches, [and] allow them  to participate in governm ent so far 
and so fast as we may find them  capable.”52
A lthough Reed, perhaps em bittered over his failure block 
the war and the annexation of Hawaii, did not exercise his 
leadership in the debate, he rem ained an adam ant opponent of 
the treaty and o f the annexation o f the Philippines. In O ctober 
1898, he wrote, “at the beginning of this year we were most 
admirably situated. We had no standing army which could 
overrun our people. We were at peace within our borders and 
with all the w orld.” The year ended in “bloody degeneracy” in 
the Philippines and the nation’s leaders, he feared, had forsaken 
the principles o f democracy.53 Hale jo ined  with two New 
England Republican stalwarts, Massachusetts Senator George 
H oar and V erm ont Senator Justin Morrill, and with several 
p rom inent Democrats to oppose to the treaty’s ratification. The 
Anti-Imperialist League included an odd assortm ent of m en and 
wom en who shared few commonalties save their aversion to 
territorial expansion; steel tycoon Andrew Carnegie, labor leader 
Samuel Gompers, reform er Jane Addams, author Mark Twain, 
and philosopher W illiamjames were am ong them. In Maine, the 
Portland Eastern Argus threw its weight behind the anti-imperial­
ists: “We derive our authority to govern, not from  the assent of 
the governed, bu t from  our right as a conqueror... If the Filipinos 
resist, this free republic will crush them  precisely as any ‘effete 
m onarchy’ would do .”54 Likewise, The Maine Farmer scorned the 
claim that the U nited States would provide freedom  and justice 
to the people o f the Philippines. The imposition o f Jim  Crow 
laws th roughout the South and the repeated failure to enact 
federal civil rights and anti-lynching laws to protect African- 
Americans provided the context for a scathing criticism of 
expansionist pretensions:
It seems strange to the average American that while the 
United States has ample authority to protect the half civilized 
Filipinos or Cubans it is powerless to protect American 
citizens at home....Can we give the Filipinos stronger 
guarantees of protection than the Negroes of the South?
...We promised the Negro political rights, but he has none.
We promised him the protection of the courts ofjustice. He
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has none whatever. He is entirely at the mercy of the whites 
of the State in which he lives. If he makes himself obnoxious, 
whites can shoot and hang him and the national government 
cannot interfere. If he attempts to vote, the whites can force 
him to desist without fear of punishment. Isn’t it about time 
for home protection?55
The final Senate vote for treaty ratification was close; it 
carried, with only one vote to spare. Hale voted “nay,” rem aining 
steadfastly against annexation to the end, convinced that a 
majority of his Maine constituents supported his decision: “in all 
the letters that I have received from  Maine,., .only two have urged 
me to vote for the treaty.”56 O n February 5, rebel forces attacked 
U.S, soldiers in Manila, igniting a war that would commit the 
U nited States to a costly three-year struggle, the first o f many 
counterrevolutionary wars that it would fight in the twentieth 
century.
W hen the Treaty of Paris was finally signed, Reed quipped 
that the U.S. had acquired “about 10,000,000 Malays at $2 a head 
unpicked, and nobody knows what it will cost to pick them .”57 
Sarcasm notwithstanding, R eed’s rem ark contained a prescient 
sense o f the costs that lay ahead. The war against the Philippine 
insurrection did not repeat the easy fight with Spain; rather it was 
a gruesome, hard-fought, and undeclared war far from  hom e for 
which few had any real enthusiasm. U.S. officers, who originally 
m aintained that they could subdue the barefoot insurgents with 
ju s t 30,000 men, were requesting 40,000 troops, and by June, 
65,000.58 In all, 120,000 U.S. troops served in the Philippines; 
nearly 4,200 were killed and 2,800 wounded. They, in turn, 
killed approximately 15,000 Filipino rebels; over 200,000 Fili­
pino civilians died as victims of disease, gunfire, starvation, and 
the effects o f a U.S. concentration camp policy.59
Although the W ar D epartm ent lim ited press coverage of 
the fighting in the Philippines, local papers throughout the 
country kept the war on the front pages. The anti-imperialist 
press in Maine — the Eastern Argus, the Maine Farmer, and the 
Whig and Currier — prom oted  peace negotiations and em pha­
sized the strength of the resistance and the terrible costs o f the
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war for the United States1’" The Argus published letters from 
Maine soldiers fighting with the regular army in the Philippines, 
describing the feelings and experiences o f dispirited and hom e­
sick soldiers and providing lurid first-hand accounts o f the war. 
A letter from a Biddeford man described a growing aversion 
am ong soldiers to war in the Philippines: “The out and out truth
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with us is that m ost of us are in sympathy with the insurgents to 
a certain extent. All American boys have been brought up in the 
air of freedom  and to fight a people who are seeking what we 
ourselves value so highly goes against our grain. We did not 
enlist to fight these people, but the Spanish.”61 A woman from  
Brunswick provided the Argus with a letter from  a soldier 
explaining that his regim ent had “burned the big church near us 
and killed over one hundred  insurgents in it....Some of the boys 
made good hauls o f jewelry and clothing.” A nother letter from  
a Red Cross volunteer described “great piles of Filipino dead ,” 
with bodies decapitated and riddled with bullets, “showing the 
determ ination of our soldiers to kill every native in sight.”62 
Anti-imperialists stepped up their campaign for a negoti­
ated peace, using these stories as evidence of the brutalizing 
effects o f the war, not only on the Filipino victims bu t on the 
young Americans, who were turning into savage killers. Bailey, 
writing for the Peace and A rbitration D epartm ent of the WCTU, 
urged the governm ent to treat the Filipinos honorably, abandon 
its insistence on  unconditional surrender, and negotiate in good 
faith with the Philippine leadership.63 O n reading the stories of 
military atrocities, Reed drafted a mock resolution for Congress 
to grant amnesty to the Spanish General Valeriano Weyler 
(despised by Americans for his brutal treatm ent of Cuban 
revolutionaries).64 On another occasion, when asked by a friend 
which route he would take to visit the Philippines, the Speaker 
replied, “Well, if you travel westward you’d reach the Philippines 
by way of Hawaii, and if you travel eastward you’ll reach Hawaii 
by way of the Philippines. The whole question is w hether you 
prefer to take your plague before your leprosy or take your 
leprosy before your plague.”65
The Maine newspapers that supported the war effort in the 
Philippines, notably the KennebecJournal and the Lewiston Evening 
Journal, quickly dismissed the letters from  soldiers as inaccurate 
or m ere anti-imperialist cant. Their editorials accused the war’s 
opponents of a lack of patriotism  bordering on treason. Their 
headlines were characteristically bold and reflected the inflated 
predictions of the U.S. generals who m aintained that the war
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would soon be won by the courageous soldiers under their 
com mand.'*
Despite persistent reports of the defeat of the Philippine 
army, the war dragged on. Aguinaldo eluded capture, and his 
soldiers continued to retake areas that had surrendered to U.S. 
authority. Tropical diseases took their toll on American soldiers.
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In late June, G eneral Otis was forced to acknowledge that he 
needed m ore troops. His health officer in Manila, assessing 
losses from  both  the fierce fighting and the spread of disease, 
estim ated that it could take as many as 150,000 American 
soldiers to suppress the insurrection.67 With this news, even the 
war’s strongest supporters began to grow worried. Frye was 
especially troubled by the high casualties; he charged that 
American generals in the Philippines had willfully deceived the 
Paris Peace Commission.68
The costs o f the war to the American taxpayer were also 
mounting, giving Reed further cause for resentm ent. He re­
ferred to McKinley’s as a “syndicated adm inistration” and won­
dered aloud why the American people seemed so quiescent, so 
willing to see the annual budget soar to $700 million a year when 
only a few years earlier they had resisted even m oderate tax 
hikes. But the Speaker had grown so disgusted with the nation’s 
drift toward imperialism that he decided not to lend his political 
weight to the w ar’s opponents.69 To the dismay of anti-imperial­
ists across the country, Reed announced on April 19, 1899 that 
he would relinquish the Speakership and retire from  Congress 
the following September. It was a terrible blow to the anti­
imperialist cause. Reed apparently understood that the exigen­
cies o f war and an expansionist foreign policy had enabled the 
president to concentrate the powers of state in the executive 
branch. His own influence and that of the legislative branch 
suffered as a consequence, and he was not interested in rem ain­
ing in a position from  which he could do little to effect the course 
of public policy. He explained his extraordinary decision to his 
friend, George Gifford: “If I went on the floor I knew all too well 
how few followers I could m uster until the people changed their 
minds. H ence it seemed to me that the best good of the cause 
would be sub-served by doing what no m an has yet done, resign 
a great place and then people would ask why and find out not by 
my direct outpourings but by their inferences.70 E.L Godkin, 
editor o f the New York Post, com pared R eed’s retirem ent to “the 
departure from  a ship o f the one m an on board who understands 
navigation.”71
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Anti-imperialists hoped that Reed would run as an indepen­
dent candidate against McKinley and William Jennings Bryan in 
the presidential election in 1900, but Reed gave them  no 
encouragem ent. He was tired.
Reed also sensed that Americans would rem ain loyal to the 
president and the course he had m apped for the country. In 
1900 McKinley selected as his running mate, Theodore Roosevelt, 
the m an m ost identified with the imperialist cause. That choice 
m ade the election a dram atic test o f support for the president’s 
foreign policy. Reed was sickened at the prospect and did not 
even cast his vote that year. Nonetheless, as he had foreseen, the 
Republican ticket easily carried Maine in a nationwide landslide 
that was read throughout the country as a ringing endorsem ent 
of the adm inistration’s war.
T he war in the Philippines finally ended with the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo in 1901, the subse­quent deterioration of his troops’ morale, and the 
successful effort of U.S. policy makers to cultivate a wealthy 
Filipino elite sympathetic to American interests in their country. 
These elites were granted limited powers o f self-government and 
the prom ise of eventual independence for the Philippines in 
exchange for their cooperation with U.S. military and civilian 
authorities in controlling any reoccurrence of civil unrest. Al­
though sporadic fighting lasted until 1913 and periodic out­
breaks occurred into the 1980s, the Filipino nationalist resis­
tance never regained the strength of its early years.
In the end, the Spanish-American war and the war against 
the Philippine insurrection left a complex and controversial 
legacy for Americans. In a relatively short period of time, the 
U.S. had em erged as a global power with a greatly expanded 
military and strategic holdings across both hem ispheres that 
allowed the nation to take its place am ong the great em pires of 
the age. For many, the outcom e m ore than justified any 
hardships incurred  and seem ed to have delivered the progress 
and national greatness that they had anticipated with such 
fanfare when it first began. The fact that the war also prom oted  
econom ic recovery from  a twenty-five year long depression,
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leaving Americans to enjoy the fruits o f victory in unprecedented  
prosperity, confirm ed for many that it really had been a “Splen­
did Little W ar.”
For Maine, the financial costs incurred, estim ated at ap­
proximately $12,000, had not been unduly burdensom e; the 
state’s economy em erged healthier than it had been for years.72 
Most significantly, the war had provided an impetus to the State’s 
m odern shipbuilding industry. Bath Iron Works rem ained a key 
industrial partner o f the military establishment and a critical 
contributor to the Maine economy in the twentieth century. 
Even the deaths of so many of M aine’s young volunteers, from  
preventable diseases, provided im portant lessons to American 
military planners, who would be better prepared  to safe-guard 
the health of soldiers in subsequent military campaigns in 
tropical regions.73
The anti-imperialist cause, so ably articulated by a group of 
Maine m en and women, was ultimately unable to prevent the 
U nited States from  becom ing an imperial power. Theodore 
Roosevelt, the arch-expansionist who became president after 
McKinley’s assassination, set in m otion a string o f military 
interventions in Central America and the Caribbean which 
would characterize Am erica’s twentieth-century foreign policy 
in that region. But the opposition of M aine’s congressional 
representatives, peace activists, writers, and reform ers to the war 
cannot be diminished. At a turning point in American history, 
they spoke out to rem ind Americans of their country’s political 
traditions, of its com m itm ent to the ideals of republicanism  and 
dem ocratic rule that they believed best expressed Am erica’s 
example for the world.
The willingness of Reed, Hale, and Boutelle to challenge 
the powerful consensus arrayed against them, and to risk, or 
sacrifice, their political careers for these principles, provided an 
im portant example for peace activists in subsequent years. 
H annah Bailey’s insistence on the use of peaceful arbitration 
became part o f a larger m ovem ent in support o f the establish­
m ent o f the W orld C ourt in 1901 and the League of Nations in 
the afterm ath o f W orld W ar I. H er writings, now part o f the
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Swarthmore College’s Peace Library collection, represent a 
com pelling contribution to peace studies in America. The Maine 
State G range’s opposition to war, as it diverted attention from  
unsolved racial problem s at hom e and siphoned off resources 
that were needed by poor farm ers to adjust to an increasingly 
competitive m arket was, by no means, a narrow, parochial 
response. R ather, it represen ts a thoughtfu l critique of 
W ashington’s decision to launch the nation in a new and risky 
venture that offered poor farm ers little in return. That these 
people did not prevail in their own time in no way diminishes the 
im portance of their efforts or their contributions to the heritage 
o f the State o f Maine and the nation.
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